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1 Introduction
The OLG model is a standard tool for modelling dynamic economic behavior over
discrete infinite time. Models of this profuse literature can be divided in two streams
depending on whether households are life-cyclers or altruists, leaving positive be-
quests. For the macroeconomic analysis of fiscal policy, these two dominant models
leads to opposite conclusions.
In OLG models with capital accumulation and life-cyclers, such as the one ini-
tially developed by Diamond (1965), the balanced growth path may be dynamically
inefficient. Then there is a case for fiscal policy such as public debt or pay-as-you-go
social security.
In dynastic OLG models with altruistic preferences (see Barro (1974)), the bal-
anced growth path is efficient and there is no case for fiscal policy. Indeed, altruists
exactly offset the positive or negative shocks on their income and on those of their
dynasty. Barro’s model turns out to be a model with infinitely-lived decision units,
namely, the dynasties, whose members are linked through operative parental altru-
ism. Then, the dynasty is the effective decision maker, since it is as long-lived as
the government. Any individual belonging to any particular dynasty can observe
the government’s budget constraint and undo any redistribution, be it financed by
current taxes (pay-as-you-go policies) or by future taxes (public debt policies).
Everything works as if on the one hand any model, which considers finite horizon
as a reasonable feature of decision-making, should not consider altruistic transfers
and, on the other hand, any model with altruistic transfers would end up with an
infinite time horizon and yield neutrality of any public transfer policy.
In this paper, in order to solve this dilemma, we implement the concept of family
altruism which is aimed at bridging the gap between Barro (1974) and Diamond
(1965) models.
In most of the literature,1 models of dynastic altruism consider that altruism links
all the descendants of an individual into a single infinitely-lived entity. Models of
pure life-cyclers feature another extreme view on private intergenerational linkages,
according to which parents and children are fully distinct economic units. In figure
1, we represent these links in the two polar canonical cases:
1See the survey of Michel, Thibault and Vidal (2005).
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Figure 1: Diamond Case (left side) vs Barro Case (right side)
For all date t, each generation Gt live two periods and, eventually, the straight
arrows represent intergenerational private transfers and dashed boxes symbolize the
relevant decision unit.
Recently, Mankiw (2000) gives facts which persuade economists that neither
the Diamond model nor the Barro model is adequate for analyzing fiscal policy.
These models are inconsistent with the empirical findings that consumption tracks
current income and with the numerous households near zero wealth. In addition, the
Diamond model is inconsistent with the great importance of bequests in aggregate
wealth accumulation (see also Arrondel, Masson and Pestieau (1997)). Moreover
in the Barro model there exists a complete harmony among all generations. As
Becker and Tomes (1986) put it, this is at odd with the observation of strategic
behavior between parents and children. Following Becker (1991), one can imagine a
less drastic approach to modelling economic relations between parents and children.
The model of family altruism considers that a family is neither a dynasty nor
an isolated household. Each individual starts a new family when he becomes adult.
In turn, the individual’s children start a new family, when adult themselves, and
so on. In this setting, a family unit has a two-period lifetime. Each period there
appear as many families as the number of young individuals and there disappear
as many families as the number of dying old individuals. Individuals are members
of two family units: the family founded by their parents and their own household.
They play a different role in these two families. They belong the the former during
their childhood and their adulthood and to the latter when adult and old. In the
former, they make no decision, being completely passive when young and being only
a descendant when adult. But in the latter they are full-fledged decision makers.
Family altruism are the sentiments between the two successive households. This
is implemented by assuming that any individual values three objects: his first-period
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consumption, his second-period consumption and his offspring’s adult disposable
income. A standard approach of taking into account children is the joy of giving
formulation in which only the gift matters (see Abel and Warshawsky (1988) or
Andreoni (1989)). In this formulation the amount and structure of bequests are
not related to children’s relative affluence but rather to parental views on what is
good for their children, or to the pleasure they derive from giving. So, our specifi-
cation of preferences seems more adequate to implement family altruism and leads
to interesting new properties. The altruist determines the starting position of his
grown-up children: indeed, by making a transfer to his offspring, he helps them to
get off to a good start. As a corollary, this specification2 also captures the idea that
parents care about their children’s income and not about the use of this income by
their children. In particular, parents let their children use the bequest as they like
in their respective families and they let them cope with taxes and transfers resulting
from policies conducted after they die. Figure 2 represents the family structure of
the family altruism concept.
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Figure 2: The Family Altruism Case
In such a setting, the altruist’s action irons out the inequalities between the
children’s opportunities. Grand children are likely to benefit from this action but
inequalities between them will be smoothed by their own parents.
Figure 1 and 2 tell us the following. In the Diamond model, life cycles are strictly
unrelated to one another. In the Barro model, life cycles are embedded inside one
another. In the family altruism model, they are hitched to one another.
The aims of this paper are to analyze the dynamical properties and to focus
2Some growth models with human capital use a similar concept of altruism. For example, the
preference of an altruist in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) depends on the quality of schools of
his children. This variable is directly linked to the adult disposable income of his children. This
problem with family altruism has been studied in Lambrecht, Michel and Vidal (2005).
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on fiscal policy conclusions of the OLG model with family altruism. Such a study
allows us to differentiate our model from the two dominant OLG models developed
by Diamond (1965) and Barro (1965) or from a mix of these standard models (Michel
and Pestieau (1998, 1999) or Mankiw (2000)).
We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium of our model using the key
concept of “desired wealth”, i.e. the wealth parents want for their children, which
can be different from their effective wealth if altruism is not operative. We show
how this feature, which is specific to family altruism, is articulated to savings and
capital accumulation.
We also study in detail the dynamics of capital accumulation of the model with
family altruism. Surprisingly enough, its monotonicity rests on fewer assumptions
when altruism is operative than when it is not. The limits of the dynamics are also
studied. Contrary to the Diamond model, an infinite limit of the capital intensity
is possible. In the same way, a poverty trap in the economy without altruism can
vanish with altruistic individuals.
Then, we examine the steady states of our model. In particular, we focus on the
existence and multiplicity of equilibria with operative bequest motive. Interestingly,
contrary to the Barro model, there may exist more than one steady state with
positive bequests and there may exist a steady state with positive bequests which
is inefficient.
The assessment of redistributive policies like public pensions or public debt goes
through the examination of their impact on the total income of the family unit.
Public pensions impact only inside the family. Taxpayers and pensions beneficiaries
belong to the same decision unit. Thus, we show that, as in the Barro model,
neutrality holds because family income remains unchanged. On the opposite, public
debt extends beyond the family unit and thus modifies the pool of incomes of family
members. Hence, as in Diamond model, public debt is not neutral.
As O’Driscol (1977) or Asso and Barucci (1988) remind us, Ricardo himself was
convinced that, theoretically, there were no difference between taxes and public
debt but that, in practice, people never think about the duration of taxes. Contrary
to models with dynastic altruism, our model with family altruism supports these
views.3
3Ricardo (1820) underlined the limitation of the altruists’ capacity to see throughout the whole
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To summarize our findings, the model with family altruism yields some new and
surprising conclusions about fiscal policy and capital accumulation which places it
halfway between the model with pure life-cyclers (Diamond (1965)) and the one
with dynastic altruists (Barro (1974)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the
model. In section 3 we establish results about the existence of an intertemporal
equilibrium. The dynamics of capital are studied in Section 4. In section 5 we focus
on the existence and the properties of steady states. In section 6 we show that the
concept of family altruism leads to interesting fiscal policy conclusions. Section 7
concludes.
2 The model with family altruism
We consider an OLG model in which agents live two periods. In period t, Nt agents
are young and supply one unit of labor. Nt grows at rate n. The income ωt of each
of the Nt young agents includes a bequests xt in addition to his wage income wt. He
consumes ct and saves st:
ct + st = wt + xt = ωt (1)
In period t+1, when he is old, his income is the return on his savings: Rt+1st, where
Rt+1 is the gross rate of return. He allocates this income to consume dt+1 and to
give a non-negative bequest xt+1 to his 1 + n children.
Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 with xt+1 ≥ 0 (2)
His preferences depend on three quantities: consumption when young, ct, consump-
tion when old, dt+1, and the income of his children (including bequest), ωt+1:
wt+1 + xt+1 = ωt+1 (3)
future: “It would be difficult to convince a man posseded of 20,000 pounds, or any other sum,
that a perpetual payment of 50 pounds per annum was equally burdensome with a single tax of
1000 pounds. He would have some vague notion that the 50 pounds per annum would be paid by
posterity, and would not be paid by him; but if he leaves his fortune to his son, and leaves it charged
with this perpetual tax, where is the difference whether he leaves him 20,000 pounds with the tax,
or 19,000 pounds without it ? This argument of charging posterity with the interest of our debt, or
of relieving them from a portion of such interest, is often used by otherwise well informed people,
but we confess we see no weight in it.”
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We assume that these preferences are represented by a utility function which is
additively separable:
U(ct, dt+1, ωt+1) = u1(ct) + u2(dt+1) + γu3(ωt+1) (4)
Expliciting the parameter γ > 0 allows to discuss, for a given function u3, the
effects of a change in the degree of altruism and to obtain the standard Diamond
(1965) model for γ=0. The three functions ui, i = 1, 2, 3, are twice continuously
differentiable on the set IR⋆+ of real positive number and verify for all positive e:
u′i(e) > 0, u
′′
i (e) < 0. We also assume lime→0 u
′
i(e) = +∞ and lime→+∞ u
′
i(e) = 0.
The standard arbitrage condition over the life cycle is:
u′1(ct) = Rt+1u
′
2(dt+1) (5)
The optimal choice of xt+1 under the constraint xt+1 ≥ 0 can be equivalently for-
mulated in terms of the children wealth ωt+1wt+1 + xt+1 and leads to
ωt+1 = max{wt+1, ω˜t+1} (6)
where ω˜t+1 is the unique positive solution of
(1 + n)u′2(Rt+1st + (1 + n)wt+1 − (1 + n)ω˜t+1) = γu
′
3(ω˜t+1) (7)
Equation (7) is the arbitrage condition between the second period consumption of
the old and the desired wealth of the children when ignoring the restriction xt+1 ≥ 0.
To study the dynamical properties of the OLG model with family altruism, the
concept of “desired wealth” ω˜t+1 is very useful for dynamic analysis.
In period 0, there are N−1 agents who are old. Each of these agents holds a
fraction s−1 = K0/N−1 of the initial capital stock K0 and receives the return R0s−1.
He allocates this income to consume d0 and leave a bequest x0 to each of his 1 + n
children. He maximizes u2(d0)+ γu3(ω0) subject to R0s−1 = d0 + (1+n)x0, x0 ≥ 0,
and ω0 = w0 + x0. The preceding analysis also applies to these choices. Thus
the behavior of the first N−1 old is characterized by the conditions (6) and (7) for
t = −1.
The production side of the economy is standard. There is a representative firm
which maximizes profits. The production function F˜ (K,L) is homogeneous of degree
one with respect to capital K and labor L. With a constant depreciation rate δ of
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capital, the sum of the production and the capital stock after depreciation F (K,L) =
F˜ (K,L)+(1−δ)K is homogenous of degree one. Then we have F (K,L) = Lf(K/L),
with f(k) = F (k, 1) where k = K/L is the capital intensity. The function f is
continuous on IR+ and twice continuously differentiable on IR
⋆
+. We assume that for
all positive k: f(k) > 0, f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0.
For given prices, wage wt and gross returnRt, the maximum of profits: F (Kt, Lt)−
wtLt − RtKt is obtained (with positive production) if (and only if) the marginal
products are equal to the prices, i.e.:
wt = F
′
L(Kt, Lt) = f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) ≡ w(kt) and Rt = F
′
K(Kt, Lt) = f
′(kt) (8)
From these relations we can define an intertemporal equilibrium the model with
family altruism.
3 The intertemporal equilibrium
Given the initial capital stock K0, an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect fore-
sight is a sequence of prices {wt, Rt}
+∞
t=0 , quantities for individual variables {ct, st, dt,
xt}
+∞
t=0 , and aggregate variables {Lt, Kt, Yt, kt}
+∞
t=0 such that all agents behave opti-
mally and all markets clear.
The stock K0 is given and equal to N−1s−1 by definition of s−1. At each period
t ≥ 1, the capital stock results from the savings of the preceding period Kt =
Nt−1st−1. The labor supply is Nt and the labor market equilibrium implies Lt = Nt.
The capital intensity is kt = Kt/Nt, and the prices verify (8). Total production is
Yt = Ntf(kt) and the good market equilibrium results from the individual budget
constraints and the firm’s allocation of incomes: Yt = wtNt +RtKt.
We shall show that at equilibrium all individual variables can be written as
functions of the capital intensity. Let us first show this property for ω˜t+1, the
solution of equation (7). According to (8), since st = (1 + n)kt+1 we have:
Rt+1st + (1 + n)wt+1 = (1 + n)(kt+1f
′(kt+1) + w(kt+1)) = (1 + n)f(kt+1)
Hence, ω˜t+1 which is the solution of (1+n)u
′
2((1+n)f(kt+1)−(1+n)ω˜t+1) = γu
′
3(ω˜t+1)
is a function of kt+1 and can be equivalently defined by:
f(kt+1)− ω˜t+1 =
1
1 + n
u′−12 (
γu′3(ω˜t+1)
1 + n
) ≡ ψ(ω˜t+1) (9)
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From the assumption on u, u′i are one-to-one decreasing functions from IR
⋆
+ onto
IR⋆+. This implies that ψ(ω˜) and ω˜ + ψ(ω˜) are one to one increasing functions from
IR⋆+ onto IR
⋆
+; and they are continuously differentiable. Thus equation (9) defines
ω˜t+1 as a function ω˜ of kt+1:
ω˜t+1 = ω˜(kt+1) (10)
The function ω˜ is increasing and differentiable on IR⋆+, and it verifies:
0 < ω˜(k) < f(k) and ω˜′(k) =
f ′(k)
1 + ψ′(ω˜(k))
> 0 (11)
At each period t, knowing ω˜t = ω˜(kt), we obtain from (6):
ωt = ω(kt) = max{w(kt), ω˜(kt)} (12)
We can now calculate xt = ω(kt) − w(kt), ct = ωt − st = ωt − (1 + n)kt+1, and
dt = f
′(kt)(1 + n)kt − (1 + n)xt.
The dynamics of the capital intensity, (1+n)kt+1 = st, is given at equilibrium by
the savings decisions which result from condition (5). By substitution, we obtain:
u′1(ωt − (1 + n)kt+1) = f
′(kt+1)u
′
2((1 + n)(f(kt+1)− ωt+1))
or equivalently:
ωt = (1 + n)kt+1 + u
′−1
1 [f
′(kt+1)u
′
2((1 + n)(f(kt+1)− ωt+1))] (13)
Since the right hand side of (13) is decreasing with respect to ωt+1 = max{w(kt+1),
ω˜(kt+1)}, it can also be written as follows:
4
ω(kt) = (1 + n)kt+1 +min{g0(kt+1), g1(kt+1)} (14)
where functions g0 and g1 are:
g0(k) = u
′−1
1 [f
′(k)u′2((1 + n)(f(k)− w(k))] (15)
g1(k) = u
′−1
1 [f
′(k)u′2((1 + n)(f(k)− ω˜(k))] (16)
We have shown that:
4We can equivalently use equation (13) with ωτ = ω(kτ ) = max{w(kτ ), ω˜(kτ )} at τ = t and
τ = t + 1. Equation (14) uses explicitly the functional forms g0 and g1 which apply respectively
when bequest are zero or are positive.
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Proposition 1 The intertemporal equilibrium
Given k0 = K0/N0, an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is uniquely
determined by a sequence of capital intensity {kt}
+∞
t=0 which verifies for all t ≥ 0 the
dynamic equation (14).
The functional form g0 with zero bequest at date t + 1 corresponds to the dy-
namics in the Diamond (1965) model without altruism (i.e. γ = 0). In reference to
the Diamond model, the variables of the model without altruism are noted by the
upper-script D. Thus, the equilibrium dynamics in the Diamond model is:
w(kDt ) = (1 + n)k
D
t+1 + g0(k
D
t+1) (17)
4 Dynamics of the capital intensity
For the dynamics with perfect foresight in the Diamond model to be well-defined
it is sufficient that for all positive kDt , equation (17) admits a unique solution k
D
t+1.
Let us first study the limits of the left hand side of equation (17). The limit when
k goes to +∞ of (1 + n)k + g0(k) is +∞, since g0(k) is positive. For the limit
when k goes to 0, since the limit of f(k) − w(k) = kf ′(k) is zero,5 the limit of
f ′(k)u′2((1 + n)(f(k)− w(k)) is +∞, and the limit of g0(k) is zero. Thus we have:
lim
k→0
(1 + n)k + g0(k) = 0 and lim
k→+∞
(1 + n)k + g0(k) = +∞ (18)
These limit properties imply that for any positive kDt , there exists at least one
value of kDt+1 solution of (17). In order to obtain a unique value of k
D
t+1 solution of
(17), one needs an additional assumption. The following condition is a sufficient
condition for the dynamics in the Diamond model are well defined.
Assumption 1 Determinacy of the dynamics in the Diamond model
The function (1 + n)k + g0(k) is strictly increasing.
The relevance of this assumption has been underlined by de la Croix and Michel
(2002). They exhibit conditions under which Assumption 1 is satisfied. For example,
it is the case when the elasticity of u′2 is greater or equal to one.
5No assumption on f at k = 0 is necessary. We have with the mean value theorem for derivatives
(with 0 < θ < 1): f(k)− f(0) = kf ′(θk) > kf ′(k) > 0 and taking the limit when k goes to 0, we
obtain limk→0 kf
′(k) = 0. The limit of f ′(k) is either finite and positive or +∞. In both cases,
limk→0 f
′(k)u′2((1 + n)(f(k)− w(k)) = +∞.
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We now study the dynamics of the capital intensity in the model with family
altruism. Since the dynamics in the Diamond model are well defined, we can compare
the two dynamics.
Proposition 2 Dynamics of capital intensity
(i) Under Assumption 1, for all positive k0, there exists a unique intertemporal
equilibrium with perfect foresight starting at k0.
(ii) The dynamics of the capital intensity are monotonic.
(iii) For all t, the dynamics verify kt ≥ k
D
t where k
D
t is the solution of the
dynamics in the economy without altruism starting at the same initial level k0.
Proof: (i) The existence for all kt of at least one solution kt+1 of equation (14)
results simply from the limit value of the right hand side. Indeed we have 0 ≤
limk→0 min{g0(k), g1(k)} ≤ limk→0 g0(k) = 0 and limk→+∞(1+n)k+min{g0(k), g1(k)}
= +∞ since g0(k) and g1(k) are non negative.
The function g1(k) is strictly increasing; indeed its derivative g
′
1 is equal to
[f ′′u′2 + f
′u′′2(1 + n)(f
′ − ω˜′)]/u′′1 and from (11), f
′ − ω˜′ is positive.
With Assumption 1, (1+n)k+min{g0(k), g1(k)} is a strictly increasing function
of k. This implies the uniqueness of kt+1 solution of (14) for given kt.
(ii) Since ω(kt) is also an increasing function of kt, the dynamics are monotonic.
(iii) Let us show kt ≥ k
D
t by induction. This is true at t = 0 since k
D
0 = k0.
Assume that it is verified at t: kt ≥ k
D
t . Then, according to (14) we have: ω(kt) ≥
w(kt) ≥ w(k
D
t ) = (1 + n)k
D
t+1 + g0(k
D
t+1)
But ω(kt) = (1+n)kt+1+ g0(kt+1) and the function (1+n)k+ g0(k) is increasing
(Assumption 1). This implies kt+1 ≥ k
D
t+1. QED
The intuition that the capital stock is larger in the economy with family altruism
than in the model without altruism is simple. Any agent willing to leave a bequest
has to save more; this of course increases the capital stock.
Since the equilibrium dynamics are monotonic, they converge either to +∞, or
to zero, or to a finite positive limit which is a steady state. We now focus on the
two first cases while the study of steady states will be treated in section 5.
In the Diamond model, an infinite limit of the capital intensity is excluded (see,
for example, Jones et Manuelli (1992)). In addition it may exist a poverty trap, i.e.,
an equilibrium dynamics which converge to zero (see Galor and Ryder (1989)).
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The introduction of the assumption of altruism allows to increase the capital
intensity. Therefore, unlike the model without altruism, the model with family
altruism can converge to +∞. In the same way, a poverty trap in the economy
without altruism can vanish with altruistic individuals (for illustrating examples see
Lambrecht, Michel and Thibault (2000)).
We can notice that our dynamic study has been conducted without restriction on
whether the economy is in a regime with positive or zero bequest. In the next section,
we refine this “general” study by exploring the long run regime of the economy.
5 The long run regime
In general, there are several steady states in the Diamond economy (see Galor and
Ryder (1989)). Each of these states is potentially a steady state in an economy with
altruism, when altruism is weak enough for the equilibrium bequest to be zero (see
Thibault (2000) for dynastic altruism). We consider this point in the case of family
altruism.
Steady states of the Diamond model are solutions of: w(k) = (1 + n)k + g0(k).
Such a value of kD is a steady state (with zero bequests) of the economy with family
altruism if and only if ω˜(kD) ≤ w(kD). By definition, ω˜(kD) is the value of ω such
that the increasing function
(1 + n)u′2[(1 + n)f
′(kD)kD + (1 + n)w(kD)− (1 + n)ω]− γu′3(ω)
is equal to zero. Thus the inequality ω˜(kD) ≤ w(kD) is equivalent to
(1 + n)u′2[(1 + n)f
′(kD)kD] ≥ γu′3(w(k
D)) (19)
This condition is simply an upper bound on the degree of altruism γ (different
for different steady states kD). Using this condition, we prove in Appendix A the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Existence of steady states
The steady states with zero bequest in the economy with family altruism are the
steady states of Diamond model which satisfy (19). If such a steady state kD does
not satisfy (19), then there exists a steady state in the economy with family altruism
which is larger than kD.
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We now focus on the steady states of the economy with family altruism and
positive bequests. According to the previous result, when the largest Diamond
steady state does not satisfy (19), the model with family altruism has a steady
state with positive bequests. In the Barro model, the modified Golden Rule is the
unique equilibrium with positive bequests. With family altruism there may exist
more than one steady state with positive bequests and there may exist a steady
state with positive bequests which is inefficient (i.e. over-accumulation of capital).
But such an inefficient steady state is excluded if the the Golden Rule capital stock
kˆ, i.e., such that f ′(kˆ) = 1 + n, satisfies the following condition:
u′1[ωˆ − (1 + n)kˆ] > (1 + n)u
′
2[(1 + n)(f(kˆ)− ωˆ)] (21)
where ωˆ is the solution of: (1 + n)u′2[(1 + n)(f(kˆ)− ωˆ)] = γu
′
3(ωˆ).
Indeed we prove in Appendix B the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Steady states with positive bequests
A multiplicity of steady states with positive bequests can exist but no more than
one with over-accumulation of capital. A sufficient condition for excluding over-
accumulation of capital is that the golden rule capital stock kˆ satisfies (21).
The property of no more than one steady state with positive bequest and over-
accumulation needs no assumption. The condition which excludes inefficiency holds
if the degree of altruism is not too large. Indeed, the solution ωˆ(γ) of (1+n)u′2[(1+
n)(f(kˆ) − ωˆ)] = γu′3(ωˆ) is an increasing function of γ. It increases from 0 to f(kˆ)
when γ increases from 0 to +∞. But the condition (21) is equivalent to ωˆ < ω¯,
where ω¯ equalizes to zero the decreasing function of ω, u′1[ω − (1 + n)kˆ] − (1 +
n)u′2[(1 + n)(f(kˆ) − ω)], which decreases from +∞ to −∞ when ω increases from
(1 + n)kˆ to f(kˆ). Then the condition (21), equivalent to ωˆ(γ) < ω¯, determines an
upper-bound γ¯ on γ.6
Without additional assumptions, there can be many steady states with positive
bequests. There is an analogy with the possibility of several steady states in the
Diamond model. Galor and Ryder (1989) exhibit a production function which illus-
trates this case, in which multiplicity is linked to non-concavity of the wage function.
6In the particular case where for all ω we have u′3(ω) ≤ u
′
1(ω) there exists no steady state with
positive bequest in over accumulation when γ ≤ 1. Indeed, at a steady state with positive bequest
we have: u′1(c) = Ru
′
2(d) =
R
1+n
u′3(ω) ≤
γR
1+n
u′1(ω) and c = ω − s < ω implies f
′(k) = R >
(1 + n)/γ ≥ 1 + n when γ ≤ 1. Any steady state then verifies k < kˆ = f ′−1(1 + n).
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In the model with family altruism, when bequests are positive, the wealth ω˜(k) is
simply linked to the production (equation (9)) and not to the wage. Irregularities
then result from the utility functions and in the example of Appendix we show that
there exists a concave utility function u3 leading to as many steady states with
positive bequests as we want.7
6 Fiscal policies
We now study fiscal policies under the assumption of operative altruism. In the
general case, the government budget constraint combines public spending (Gt) and
previous debt reimbursement8 at time t (RtBt−1), on the one hand, taxes collected
on the young (Ntτ
1
t ) and on the old Nt−1τ
2
t (positive or negative) and new debt issue
on the other (Bt):
Gt +RtBt−1 = Ntτ
1
t +Nt−1τ
2
t +Bt
Since individual preferences do not depend on public expenditures and since we
focus on purely redistributive fiscal policies, we set Gt = 0. The total amount of
taxes Tt is equal to the sum of the taxes bearing on young and old at time t:
Tt = Ntτ
1
t +Nt−1τ
2
t
Thus the government budget constraint writes :
RtBt−1 = Tt +Bt
A pay-as-you-go pension system is a special case of this government budget
constraint with, for all t, Bt = 0 and Ntτ
1
t = Nt−1 (−τ
2
t ). Let bt = Bt/Nt and
tt = Tt/Nt = τ
1
t + (1 + n)
−1 τ 2t , then time t new bonds issue per head of young
individuals are given by :
bt = (1 + n)
−1Rtbt−1 − tt (22)
Let us sketch quickly the amendments to the model without public debt. The
introduction of governmental taxes modifies the individuals’ constraints as follows:
ct + st = wt + xt − τ
1
t = ωt
7With a CES utility function, the steady state is unique (see Lambrecht, Michel and Thibault
(2000)).
8Bonds are assumed to have a single period maturity.
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Rt+1st − τ
2
t+1 = dt+1 + (1 + n) xt+1
ωt+1 = wt+1 + xt+1 − τ
1
t+1
The individuals’ first-order conditions remain unchanged. The representative
firm’s behavior is unaffected.
Governmental bonds compete with private physical capital. If bonds are to be
exchanged in equilibrium, they must bear the same return than physical capital. In
equilibrium we now have :
st = (1 + n) kt+1 + bt
In the model without public debt, ωt+1 solves (1 + n) u
′
2 (dt+1) = u
′
3 (ωt+1) , with
dt+1 = Rt+1 (1 + n) kt+1 − (1 + n) (ωt+1 − w (kt+1)) and is an increasing function of
capital intensity kt+1. In the model with public debt, it solves (1 + n)u
′
2 (dt+1) =
u′3 (ωt+1) with dt+1 = Rt+1st− τ
2
t+1− (1 + n) xt+1. Using the modified xt+1 = ωt+1−
w (kt+1)+τ
1
t+1 and st = (1 + n) kt+1+bt, as well as the government budget constraint
(22), this expression of dt+1 can be rewritten as follows :
dt+1 = (1 + n) [f (kt+1) + bt+1 − ωt+1]
Consequently equation (9) becomes: f (kt+1) + bt+1 − ωt+1 = ψ (ωt+1) and the
young disposable income can be written as a function ω˜ of kt+1 and bt+1 from:
ωt+1 + ψ (ωt+1) = f (kt+1) + bt+1 (23)
The function ω˜ has the following properties:
ω˜′k =
f ′
1 + ψ′
> 0 and ω˜′b =
1
1 + ψ′
∈ (0, 1)
With respect to the model without policy, public debt modifies the allocation
between the old’s consumption ψ (ωt+1) and the young’s income ωt+1 because the
size of the ”cake” to be divided in each period is now f (kt+1) + bt+1
We now turn the the dynamics of capital intensity. The equation (13) describing
the motion of capital intensity becomes
ω˜ (kt, bt) = (1 + n) kt+1 + bt+1 + g1 (kt+1, bt+1) ≡ G (kt+1, bt+1) (24)
with: g1 = u
′−1
1 [f
′ (kt+1) u
′
2 ((1 + n) (f (kt+1) + bt+1 − ω˜(kt+1, bt+1)))].
It is interesting to note that in the equilibrium dynamics (equation (24)), the
level of public debts matters but not the taxes or the transfers. In the economy with
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family altruism, the two policies of public debt and intergenerational transfers are
not equivalent, although they are equivalent in the Diamond economy (Buiter and
Kletzer (1998)) and in the Barro economy (since both are neutral).
The property of non-equivalence can be explained by considering the family
income of one period which is equal to the sum of the income of the old agent and
the income of his 1 + n children, i.e. in period t+ 1:
Ωt+1 = Rt+1st + (1 + n)wt+1
This income finances the consumption of the old dt+1 and the income of the
young (1 + n)ωt+1. This income is modified by a change in debt policy, because
st = (1 + n)kt+1 + bt is modified. Then, the optimal arbitrage in period t + 1
between dt+1 and ωt+1, i.e. the solution of maximizing u2(dt+1) + γu3(ωt+1) subject
to dt+1 + (1 + n)ωt+1 = Ωt+1, is also modified.
It is also interesting to note that the same arbitrage applies when there is a
second period additional income of the old. For example, if there is a supply of θ
units of labor in the second period of life, the family income in period t+ 1 is:
Ωt+1 = Rt+1st + θwt+1 + (1 + n)wt+1
The second period of life income of the young will occur in period t + 2 and does
not enter in the family income of period t+ 1. It will enter the young’s own family
income of period t+ 2 together with taxes and transfers of period t+ 2.
Note finally that if we want explicitly to introduce an additional income in the
last period of life, this additional income must be correlated with the capital accu-
mulation. In other words, we cannot work in an exchange economy framework. As
a result, there are not many papers dealing with non ad-hoc ways of introducing
an additional income in the last period of life linked to the capital stock. However
according to Decreuse and Thibault (2001)9, our next fiscal policy results are ro-
bust to the introduction of an additional income in the last period of life as in the
Diamond’s framework.
9Recently, by contrast to Diamond (1965), Decreuse and Thibault (2001) consider a very simple
OLG model in which agents work during their second period of life. They assume that there is
an age-specific labor productivity which is related to the age-earnings profile studied in labor eco-
nomics. The authors exhibit sufficient conditions ruling out dynamic inefficiency (or, equivalently
the non-neutrality of public debt) if age-specific labor productivity is sufficiently strong.
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Proposition 5 Determination of the intertemporal equilibrium
Given initial conditions k0 and b−1 = 0, the intertemporal equilibrium {kt+1}
+∞
t=0
with unconstrained bequests is determined by the sequence of public debt levels (per
young, {bt}
+∞
t=1 ), or, equivalently, by the sequence of total taxes (per young, {tt}
+∞
t=0 ).
As long as bequests are unconstrained, the intertemporal equilibrium does not depend
on the allocation of taxes between the young and the old.
Proof: Equation (24) only involves capital intensities and debt levels. The equiva-
lence between tax levels tt and debt levels bt in determining the equilibrium comes
from the budget constraint bt = (1 + n)
−1Rtbt−1 − tt. At each period t, given the
debt level bt−1, choosing tt implies the debt level bt. Alternatively, choosing a debt
level bt implies a tax level tt. QED
From this proposition it is straightforward to deduce the following result:
Proposition 6 Neutrality of a pay-as-you-go pension system
A special case of the preceding proposition is obtained with no debt, i.e. with
pay-as-you-go pension system. In that case, proposition 5 means that there is no
effect on the equilibrium
Proof: Pay-as-you-go policies are equivalent to bt = 0. Thus the dynamics are
unchanged with respect to the absence of fiscal policy. QED
The interpretation of this result is that transfers inside the family completely off-
set public transfers. Any increase in the taxes levied on the young is compensated
by an increase in the old’s bequest. Indeed, as you can see in Figure 3, public inter-
generational transfers (the broken arrows) generated by the pay-as-you-go pension
system are neutralized inside the family unit by private intergenerational transfers
(the straight arrows).
Gt
Gt+1
Gt+2


?
?
Figure 3: Neutrality of PAYG Social Security – The Family Altruism Case
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This feature is thus common to the family altruism model and the dynastic
altruism model. Indeed, Figure 4 explains intuitively why a pay-as-you-go pension
system is neutral in the Barro’s framework but not in the Diamond’s one.
Gt
Gt+1
Gt+2


?
Gt
Gt+1
Gt+2
?


Figure 4: PAYG Social Security – Diamond (left side) vs Barro (right side)
Let us focus now on the effects of public debt in our model with family altruism:
Proposition 7 The effects of public debt
An increase public debt bt+1 in period t+1 increases consumption of the genera-
tion born in t, ct and dt+1 and reduces the capital stock in all the following periods.
Proof: We first compute dkt+1/dbt+1. We have:
g′1k = [f
′′u′2 + f
′u′′2 (1 + n) (f
′ − ω˜′k)]u
′′−1
1 > 0
G′k = (1 + n) + g
′
1k > 0
g′1b = f
′u′′2u
′′−1
1 (1 + n) (1− ω˜
′
b) > 0
G′b = 1 + g
′
1b > 0
Hence, dkt+1/dbt+1 = −G
′
b/G
′
k < 0. The dynamics are monotonic : thus the capital
stock is reduced in all the following periods. Then we compute ∂ct/∂bt+1, the effect
on consumption at time t, with ct = ω˜ (kt, bt)− (1 + n) kt+1 and ∂dt+1/∂bt+1, the ef-
fect on consumption at time t+1,with dt+1 = (1 + n) [f (kt+1) + bt+1 − ω˜ (kt+1, bt+1)].
Then:
∂ct
∂bt+1
= − (1 + n)
dkt+1
dbt+1
> 0
Since u′1(ct) = f
′(kt+1)u
′
2(dt+1) we have:
u′′1
∂ct
∂bt+1
= f ′u′′2
∂dt+1
∂bt+1
+ f ′′u′2
∂kt+1
∂bt+1
Then: f ′u′′2
∂dt+1
∂bt+1
=
∂kt+1
∂bt+1
(−(1 + n)u′′1 − f
′′u′2) < 0, and ∂dt+1/∂bt+1 > 0. QED
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This is in line with the conventional view of public debt. This view distinguishes
between short run effects and long run effects. In the short run, each household
spends more on consumption goods. This leads to an increase in aggregate demand
for output and to an increase in national income. However capital accumulation is
reduced by substitution of government bonds to firm assets. Precisely, our propo-
sition shows that the increase in debts at some date increases the consumption of
the old generation at the current period and decreases the capital stock available
for production.
Intuitively, public debt is not neutral in our setting because, according to Figure
5, public intergenerational transfers (the broken arrows) generated by the public debt
can not be neutralized inside the family unit by private intergenerational transfers
(the straight arrows).
Gt
Gt+1
Gt+2
?
?
>
R
Figure 5: Non Neutrality of Public Debt – Family Altruism Case
The non-neutrality result of public debt in the family altruism model is a common
feature with the Diamond model. Indeed, Figure 6 explains intuitively why a public
debt policy is neutral in the Diamond’s framework but not in the Barro’s one.
Gt
Gt+1
Gt+2

R
Gt
Gt+1
Gt+2
?
?
3
R
Figure 6: Public Debt – Diamond (left side) vs Barro Case (right side)
Then, family altruism is the first concept of altruism which leads to fiscal policy
conclusions that are less clear-cut than those obtained in the canonical macrody-
namic models with pure life-cyclers (Diamond (1965)) and the ones of the dynastic
18
altruism (Barro (1974)) and the ones with warm glow altruism (Andreoni (1989)).In-
deed, this concept allows to differentiate the effect of a public debt policy and of a
pay as you go social security.
7 Conclusion
We studied an amended formulation of the altruistic transfer motive in the frame-
work of an OLG model. The idea of the family altruism used in this paper is that
altruistic parents care only about their children income and not about the use of
this income made by the children. Models with human capital (see e.g. Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992)) have used this particular specification of altruism of the adult
disposable income. In this paper, we translate it to a model with physical capital.
Altruism Family Diamond joy of giving
a` la Barro altruism model altruism
Horizon of
foresight Infinite One period One period One period
Neutrality of a pay
as you go pension Yes Yes No No
Neutrality of
a public debt Yes No No No
Uniqueness of
the steady state Yes No No No
Possibility of existence
of equilibrium with
overaccumulation No Yes Yes Yes
Unlimited
growth Yes Yes No Yes
Table 1: Barro vs Family altruism vs Diamond vs Joy of giving
It is convenient to summarize our results by systematically comparing them with
those of the Barro and the Diamond model. As it is shown in the table 1, the family
altruism model has two common points with the Barro model: the neutrality of
pay-as-you-go pensions and the possibility of unlimited growth. With respect to the
Diamond model, it has four common points: the one-period horizon of foresight, the
non-neutrality of public debt, the possibility of multiple steady states and, finally,
the possibility of existence of an equilibrium in over-accumulation. We also compare
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these results with the conclusions of the joy of giving model. For this model, the
only difference with the Diamond model in Table 1 is the possibility of unlimited
growth.
In the light of our findings, the family formulation of altruism might act as
filling in a gap between the life-cycle model and Barro’s dynastic model of altruism
which are the two benchmarks of the economic analysis of intertemporal choices
and dynamics. Throughout our analysis, the concept of desired wealth revealed how
central it was. At the level of decision-making, it suitably summarizes the altruist’s
possibly constrained bequest choice. At the level of the intertemporal equilibrium, it
proved to be quite useful in establishing the monotonicity of the dynamics. Finally
note that the introduction of the assumption of altruism allows to increase the
capital intensity. Therefore, a poverty trap in the Diamond economy can vanish
with individuals motivated by family altruism or by joy of giving.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a steady state kD of the economy without altruism (γ = 0). Then
in the economy with family altruism (γ > 0) we show that: (i) Inequality (19) is
verified and kD is a steady state with zero bequest. (ii) Inequality (19) is not verified
and there exists a steady state larger than kD (may be +∞).
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(i) As seen, if kD verified (19), it is a steady state with zero bequest of the
economy with family altruism.
(ii) If kD is not a steady-state of the economy with family altruism there are two
possibilities. If it exists a Diamond equilibrium larger than kD which satisfies (19)
this equilibrium is an equilibrium of model with family altruism. In the converse
case, since the largest steady state kDmax of the economy without altruism does not
verified (19) we have:
(1 + n)u′2[(1 + n)f
′(kDmax)k
D
max] < γu
′
3(w(k
D
max)) (20)
This inequality implies that ω˜(kDmax) > w(k
D
max) and that, if kt = k
D
max, then
kt+1 > kt. Indeed,
ωt = ω˜(k
D
max) > (1 + n)k
D
max + g0(k
D
max) ≥ (1 + n)k
D
max +min{g0(k
D
max), g1(k
D
max)}
and ωt = (1 + n)kt+1 +min{g0(kt+1), g1(kt+1)} imply that kt+1 > k
D
max.
Thus the equilibrium dynamics {kt}
+∞
t=0 starting at k0 = k
D
max is increasing. Ei-
ther it goes to +∞ or it converges to a steady state. When it converges to a finite
limit, bequests at the steady state are necessarily positive because it is not a steady
state of the economy without bequest. When it converges to +∞, we may say that
+∞ is a “steady state” of the economy with family altruism, and, for large t, be-
quests are necessarily positive (zero bequests imply a decrease in k for large t).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
We show that: (i) There can exists a multiplicity of steady state with positive
bequests. (ii) There exists no more than one steady state with positive bequests
and over-accumulation of capital. (iii) All the steady states with positive bequests
are efficient if the condition (21) is verified.
(i) Assume that U(c, d, ω) = ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γu3(ω) and f(kt) = k
α
t with
α ≤ 1/2 such that 1 + β < α(1 − α)/(1 − 2α). For all positive p, we show in
Appendix C that it exists a concave function u3 such that the model with family
altruism experiences at least p equilibria with positive bequests.
(ii) According to (13), a steady state verifies if it exists:
h(ω, k) ≡ u′1[ω − (1 + n)k]− f
′(k)u′2[(1 + n)(f(k)− ω)] = 0
This condition defines a curve C1: ω = ω1(k) such that:
ω′1(k) = −
h′k(ω, k)
h′ω(ω, k)
=
−(1 + n)u′′1 − f
′′u′2 − (1 + n)f
′2u′′2
−u′′1 − (1 + n)f
′u′′2
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and if f ′(k) ≤ 1 + n, then ω′1(k) > f
′(k). But a steady state with positive bequests
also verifies ω = ω˜(k), i.e. (k, ω) belongs to the curve C2 defined by f(k) = ω˜+ψ(ω˜);
and we have (relation (11)) ω˜′(k) < f ′(k). Since the two curves C1 and C2 verify
ω˜′(k) < ω′1(k) for all k ≥ kˆ, they cannot intersect more than once.
(iii) Moreover, the two curves C1 and C2 do not intersect (in over-accumulation
of capital) when ω˜(kˆ) < ω1(kˆ). The value of ωˆ = ω˜(kˆ) is determined by (1+n)u
′
2[(1+
n)(f(kˆ)− ωˆ)] = γu′3(ωˆ) and ω1(kˆ) > ωˆ is equivalent to (21).
Appendix C: Steady states with positive bequests
Assume that U(c, d, ω) = ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γu3(ω) and f(kt) = k
α
t with α ≤ 1/2
such that 1 + β < α(1− α)/(1− 2α). For all positive p, we will show that it exists
a concave function u3 such that the model with family altruism experiences at least
p equilibria with positive bequests.
Step 1: Characterization of equilibria with positive bequests.
With our utility specification the function ψ and g1 of equation (9) and (16) are:
Ψ(ω) =
β
γu′3(ω)
and g1(k) =
(1 + n)k1−α
αγu′3(ω)
Then, since f(k) = kα = ω +Ψ(ω) we have k = (ω +
β
γu′3(ω)
)1/α.
Therefore, the ω which are equilibria with positive bequests must satisfy :
ω = (1 + n)(ω +
β
γu′3(ω)
)1/α + g1((ω +
β
γu′3(ω)
)1/α)
ω > (1− α)(ω +
β
γu′3(ω)
)
Hence, any ω which satisfies the two following conditions is an equilibrium with
positive bequests:
ω
1−α
α (1 +
β
γωu′3(ω)
)
1
α (1 +
1
αβ + αγωu′3(ω)
)−
1
1 + n
= 0 (25)
γ >
(1− α)β
αωu′3(ω)
(26)
Step 2: Construction and variation of pairs (ω¯,σ¯).
For all positive µ, we can define ω¯ and σ¯ such that:
ω¯ = (1 + n)
α
α−1 (1 +
α
(1− α)µ
)
1
α−1 (1 +
1
β(α+ (1− α)µ)
)
α
α−1
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σ¯ =
µ(1− α)β
αγω¯
=
µ(1− α)β
αγ(1 + n)
α
α−1
(1 +
α
µ(1− α)
)
1
1−α (1 +
1
β(α+ (1− α)µ)
)
α
1−α
It is obvious to show that ω¯ increases with respect to µ.
Since σ¯ = f(µ) = A ∗ B(µ)
1
1−α ∗ C(µ)
α
1−α where A = [(1 + n)
α
1−αβ]/γ, B(µ) =
[µ(1− α))/α]1−α + [µ(1− α)/α]−α, and C(µ) = 1 + 1/[β(α+ (1− α)µ)] we have:
f ′(µ) =
A
1− α
B′(µ)B(µ)
α
1−αC(µ)
α
1−α +
αA
1− α
B(µ)
1
1−αC ′(µ)C(µ)
2α−1
1−α
Hence f ′(1) has the sign of B′(1) + αB(1)C ′(1)/C(1).
Since B(1) = αα−1/(1− α)α, B′(1) = αα−1(1− 2α)/(1− α)α, C(1) = (1 + β)/β
and C ′(1) = (α−1)/β, f ′(1) has the sign of (1−2α)(1+β)+α(α−1). Hence f ′(1)
is negative. Thus it exists κ > 0 such that ∀ µ ∈]1− κ, 1 + κ[ f ′(µ) < 0.
Step 3: Existence of u3 to obtain p equilibria with positive bequests.
Let p be a positive integer. According to step 2 we can construct an increasing
sequence of real numbers µ1, µ2,..., µp such that:
∀ i ∈ 1, ..., p 1 < µi < 1 + κ and f
′(µi) < 0
For each µi we construct the pair (ω¯i, σ¯i) studied in step 2.
Since ω¯1, ω¯2,..., ω¯p are distinct, it exists a differentiable decreasing function
u′3:IR
+ → IR+ such that
∀ i ∈ 1, ..., p v′(ω¯i) = σ¯i
The function u′3 can be decreasing because ∂ω¯i/∂µi > 0 and f
′(µi) < 0 implies
∂σ¯i/∂µi < 0. Since u
′
3(ω) is integrable (because continuous) we can construct a
differentiable function u3(ω) such that its derivative is the function u
′
3(ω). And,
since u′3 is a decreasing function, u3 is a concave function.
By construction, for all i we have ω¯iu
′
3(ω¯i) = [µi(1− α)β]/(αγ).
Then, since µi > 1, ω¯i satisfies (26).
Moreover, substituting ω¯iu
′
3(ω¯i) by [µi(1−α)β]/(αγ) in (25), we can easily check
that ω¯i also satisfies (25).
Therefore, we have constructed a concave function u3 such that the p ω¯i’s verify
(25) and (26). Hence, according to step 1, our model has at least p equilibria with
positive bequests.
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